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State v. Moore: Judicial Discretion Versus Determinate
Sentencing Under the Fair Sentencing Act
In 1979 the North Carolina General Assembly responded to the national
movement towards determinate sentencing laws1 by enacting the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act (FSA). 2 A primary goal of the legislation is to eliminate the wide dis-
parities in punishment for similar offenses which have become a growing
concern to many criminal law reformers. 3 To effectuate this aim, the FSA at-
tempts to reduce and regulate the exercise of judicial discretion in the sentencing
of convicted felons. 4 Trial judges are now required to impose a presumptive
term set by statute unless the judge finds there are aggravating or mitigating
factors reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing.5
Despite the general assembly's attempt to reduce judicial discretion, ambi-
guities in the FSA and judicial interpretation of the act have provided trial
courts with an opportunity to reassert broad discretionary powers during the
sentencing process. A recent North Carolina Supreme Court decision, State v.
Moore,6 illustrates the movement in this direction.
In Moore the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a defendant's admis-
sion during trial of prior criminal activity, although not sufficient to prove the
statutory aggravating factor of a "prior conviction,"' 7 is credible evidence to
show character and thus can be used to aggravate a defendant's sentence beyond
1. Determinate sentencing has been heralded as the major correction reform of the 1980s. See
Hepburn & Goldstein, Organization Imperatives and Sentencing Reform Implementation, 32 CRIME
& DELINQ. 339, 341 (1986); Hussey & Lagoy, The Impact ofDeterminate Sentencing Structures, 17
CRIM. L. BULL. 197 (1981). "The central feature of determinate penalty reforms is the establish-
ment of express standards on how much punishment should be imposed... upon persons convicted
of various types of criminal conduct." von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems in
America: An Overview, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 289, 290 (1981). State legislatures have adopted a
variety of determinate penalty schemes. See id. at 296-312 (citing and discussing various determi-
nate penalty schemes).
2. Act of June 4, 1979, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of Chapters 14, 15A, 18A, 20, 21, 53, 90, 105, 108, 130, 148, and 163 of North Carolina
General Statutes). Several amendments were passed the following year. Act of June 25, 1980, ch.
1316, 1980 N.C. Sess. Laws 247 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Chapters 14, 15A, 20,
21, 105, 108, 148, and 163 of North Carolina General Statutes). The final amendments were passed
in the 1981 session. Act of April 6, 1981, ch. 179, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 150 (codified in scattered
sections of Chapters 14 and 15A of North Carolina General Statutes).
3. Sentencing disparity had grown to alarming proportions. See TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE]. See also Hussey & Lagoy, supra note 1, at 206 ("[C]hanges envisioned in the proposals of
[determinate sentencing schemes] include reduction of disparity and discretion, increasing equity
and proportionality, and decreasing the length of prison terms.").
4. For an overview of the provisions of the FSA, see S. CLARKE & E. RUBINSKY, NORTH
CAROLINA'S FAIR SENTENCING ACT: EXPLANATION, TEXT AND FELONY CLASSIFICATION TABLE
(1981); Comment, The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act, 60 N.C.L. REv. 631 (1982); Comment,
North Carolina's Fair Sentencing Act: Is It Fair?, 20 WAKE FOREST L. Rv. 165 (1984). "In order
to scale punishments to the seriousness of crimes, there need to be explicit guidelines .... Otherwise,
individual judges having different moral outlooks could impose divergent sanctions for similar crimi-
nal acts." von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 291.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a), (b) (1983).
6. 317 N.C. 275, 345 S.E.2d 217 (1986).
7. See infra note 14.
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the presumptive term. 8 The court also held that age alone is not sufficient to
require a trial court to find a "'defendant's immaturity or his limited mental
capacity' " to be a mitigating factor.9
This Note analyzes Moore, its background, and the implications it will have
for the FSA. The Note concludes that the North Carolina Supreme Court was
correct to reject the idea that age alone is a mitigating factor under the FSA.
However, to allow an admission of prior criminal activity for which a defendant
has never been prosecuted to be considered as an aggravating factor will subvert
one of the original purposes behind the FSA: the elimination of disparity in
criminal sentencing.
In April 1984 seventeen year old Terry Lee Moore was convicted of second
degree murder,10 a Class C felony that carried a presumptive term of fifteen
years under the FSA. 11 During trial defendant produced evidence which
showed that he had no prior criminal convictions. Witnesses also testified to
defendant's good character and standing in the community. However, under
cross-examination defendant admitted to having sold and used drugs and to
having broken into various motel rooms to support his drug use. 12 He had never
been prosecuted for these activities.
In sentencing defendant the trial court found as mitigating factors that de-
fendant was a person of good character and reputation, and that he had no prior
convictions as defined by statute.' 3 However, the trial court also found as a non-
statutory aggravating factor that defendant had admitted to engaging in criminal
offenses, "all of which carry sentences in excess of 60 days."' 14 The trial court,
after considering the evidence, found that the aggravating factors outweighed
the mitigating factors and defendant was sentenced to forty-five years in prison,
three times the presumptive term under the FSA.15
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals was presented with two
8. Moore, 317 N.C. at 278-80, 345 S.E.2d at 220-21.
9. Id. at 280-81, 345 S.E.2d at 221 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(e) (1983)).
10. Id. at 277, 345 S.E.2d at 219.
11. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986) (second degree murder punishable as a Class C fel-
ony); Id. § 1340.4(f)(1) (1983) (presumptive term of 15 years for Class C felony).
12. Moore, 317 N.C. at 276-77, 345 S.E.2d at 219.
13. Id. at 277, 345 S.E.2d at 219. Good character and reputation and a history of no prior
criminal convictions are statutory mitigating factors that the trial court must consider when deter-
mining punishment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). The judge is required to "find" the
factors only if they have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
14. Moore, 317 N.C. at 276-77, 345 S.E.2d at 219. The FSA considers prior convictions pun-
ishable by more than 60 days' confinement as an aggravating factor that the judge must consider.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(o) (1983). Engaging in criminal activity punishable by more
than 60 days' confinement is not an aggravating factor outlined by statute. See id. § 15A-
1340.4(a)(1). The dissenting opinion in Moore argued that the trial judge treated the admissions of
criminal activity as the equivalent of a prior conviction. Moore, 317 N.C. at 281-83, 345 S.E.2d at
222 (Exum, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 34-35, 109-12.
15. Moore, 317 N.C. at 277, 345 S.E.2d at 219. Before a judge may impose a sentence that
exceeds the presumptive sentence, he must specifically find that the aggravating circumstances out-
weigh the mitigating factors. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(b) (1983). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 84-97 (discussing how factors should be weighed).
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issues regarding defendant's sentence.1 6 First, defendant claimed the trial court
had failed to consider his age as a mitigating factor, which is required by the
"logic" and "purpose" of the FSA. 17 The court of appeals unanimously rejected
this contention, holding that a "person at 17 years of age should be as well aware
as any person of the wrong involved in the commission of murder." 18 Second,
defendant claimed the trial court had considered improperly defendant's admis-
sion of prior criminal activity as an aggravating factor.' 9 Defendant argued that
using these admissions to aggravate the sentence contradicted the "legislature's
evidenced intent that prior criminal acts be considered in aggravation only when
they are properly supported by a judgment of conviction."'20 A divided court of
appeals, citing State v. Thompson,2 1 rejected this contention as well.22 In
Thompson the court of appeals considered a defendant's admission of a prior
conviction as credible evidence to support a "finding" of a prior conviction.23
The court of appeals in Moore held that if prior convictions were reasonably
related to the purposes of sentencing, so too must admissions of criminal activity
punishable by sixty days' confinement be related to the purposes of sentencing.24
Judge Becton dissented, reasoning that the same procedural safeguards that
made the admission of a prior conviction "presumably verifiable [and] ... valid"
in Thompson do not attach to the admission of activities for which the State has
never sought punishment. 25
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, acknowledged Judge
Becton's dissent, noting that admissions of prior criminal activity are not synon-
ymous with prior convictions. 26 In afflirming the decision of the court of ap-
peals, however, Justice Martin reasoned that it is more "natural" to view the
admissions as bearing on the defendant's character rather than "force them to fit
the prior-conviction factor."'27 Because character is a proper item for a trial
court to consider when weighing aggravating and mitigating factors,2 8 the ma-
16. State v. Moore, 78 N.C. App. 77, 337 S.E.2d 66 (1985), modified and aff'd, 317 N.C. 275,
345 S.E.2d 217 (1986).
17. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 17, Moore (No. 843SCI 195).
18. Moore, 78 N.C. App. at 83, 337 S.E.2d at 69.
19. Id.
20. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 15, Moore.
21. 60 N.C. App. 679, 300 S.E.2d 29, modified on other grounds, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156
(1983).
22. Moore, 78 N.C. App. at 83, 337 S.E.2d at 69.
23. Thompson, 60 N.C. App. at 684, 300 S.E.2d at 32. In analyzing the mandate of the FSA it
is imperative to draw a distinction between "consider" and "find" as set out in the statute. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). See State v. Spears, 314 N.C. 319, 321-22, 333 S.E.2d 242, 244
(1985) (discussing differences between "must" and "may" consider).
24. Moore, 78 N.C. App. at 83, 337 S.E.2d at 69.
25. Id. at 84, 337 S.E.2d at 70 (Becton, J., dissenting in part & concurring in part). Judge
Becton was concerned about equating the admissions of criminal activity with a criminal conviction.
See infra text accompanying notes 108-11.
26. Moore, 317 N.C. at 278, 345 S.E.2d at 220.
27. Id. This analysis was a critical step in fashioning the rule that the court set out in Moore.
The dissenting opinion in Moore did not challenge this reasoning. See id. at 281-83, 345 S.E.2d at
222 (Exum, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the use of character in aggravating sentences, see
infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
28. This Note argues that a trial court's use of character in the pre-FSA period should not be
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jority held that admissions on the stand of felonious activity satisfied the statu-
tory requisites for proving character.29 Therefore, the admissions could be used
by the trial court to aggravate defendant's sentence. 30 The majority also agreed
with the court of appeals' conclusions on the issue of age by refusing to apply a
"hard and fast rule" to the definition of "immaturity" in the statute.31
Justice Exum, writing for the dissent, took issue with the majority's conclu-
sions regarding the admissions. Although he did not quarrel with the rule enun-
ciated by the court, Justice Exum disagreed with the application of the rule to
the facts in Moore.3 2 Conceding that defendant's admissions should go to the
question of character, 33 the dissent suggested that the acknowledgements of past
criminal activity could just as easily be viewed as a positive reflection on charac-
ter as a negative one.3 4 However, regardless of how the admissions should be
viewed, according to the dissent the trial court did not weigh the admissions as
proof of character. Rather, the trial court regarded them as the essential
equivalent of a prior conviction. The dissent, therefore, would have remanded
the case for resentencing in light of the rule set out by the court.35
Trial courts traditionally have exercised broad discretion in imposing pun-
ishment. 36 In the view of many reformers this power has led to serious problems
within the criminal justice system.3 7 Significant disparities in sentences among
blacks and whites, and males and females often have been cited as symptoms of
a system gone astray.38
The FSA attempts to reduce sentencing disparities by setting a presumptive
and a maximum prison term for each felony.3 9 If a judge decides to depart from
the presumptive term he or she is required to find and to specify that either
statutory and nonstatutory aggravating or mitigating factors-reasonably re-
synonymous with the use of character under the FSA. See infra notes 78-80, 100-105 and accompa-
nying text. This analysis questions a critical underpinning in the majority's reasoning.
29. Moore, 317 N.C. at 279, 345 S.E.2d at 220.
30. Id. at 279-80, 345 S.E.2d at 221.
31. Id. at 280-81, 345 S.E.2d at 221 (quoting State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 372, 307 S.E.2d 304,
333 (1983)).
32. Id. at 281-83, 345 S.E.2d at 222 (Exum, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 282, 345 S.E.2d at 222 (Exum, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 281-83, 345 S.E.2d at 222 (Exum, J., dissenting).
36. See, eg., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) ("sentence imposed by a
federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review"); United States v.
Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439, 1444 (4th Cir. 1985) (sentencing judge has discretion to consider matters
that would not be admissible at trial). See also State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 81-82, 265 S.E.2d 164,
171 (1980) (trial judge should look to several characteristics in assessing punishment). See infra text
accompanying notes 66-69.
37. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that a major flaw is "capricious and arbitrary
nature of criminal sentencing").
38. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 4-9. Recent statistical analysis of sentences in North Caro-
lina from 1976 to 1986 shows that the FSA has been a major force in reducing sentencing disparity.
S. CLARKE, FELONY SENTENCING IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1976-1986: EFFECTS OF PRESUMPTIVE
SENTENCING LEGISLATION 9-22 (May 1987). However, the report suggests that the FSA had no
effect on male/female sentencing differences but may have had some effect in black/white sentencing
differences where these existed. Id. at 319-20.
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(f) (1983) (presumptive terms set for each class felony); Id.
§ 14-1.1 (1986) (maximum terms set for each class felony).
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lated to the purposes of sentencing-have been proved by a preponderance of
evidence.40 No findings are required if the term is imposed pursuant to a plea
arrangement or, in certain circumstances, if two or more convictions have been
consolidated for judgment.41
The issue of what constitutes an aggravating or mitigating factor has been
litigated heavily in North Carolina.42 The FSA provides that the trial judge
must consider the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in the statute.43 The
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that defendant carries the burden of
persuasion for proving statutory mitigating factors.44 The trial judge, although
obligated to consider a statutory factor, is required to find a factor as mitigating
only if the evidence supporting it is "uncontradicted, substantial, and manifestly
credible."'45
Prior to Moore North Carolina courts had never addressed whether age
alone was to be regarded as a mitigating factor. 46 The FSA requires the trial
judge to consider the defendant's "immaturity or limited mental capacity" as
mitigating.47 In State v. Taylor 48 the supreme court held that limited mental
capacity means "limited intelligence or low I.Q. ' '49 Defendant in Moore, how-
ever, contended that "immaturity" meant "tender years."' 50 Because Moore was
seventeen years old when he committed the crime, he argued that his "tender
years" required a finding of mitigation. 5 1 The supreme court properly rejected
this claim, stating the general assembly's use of "immaturity" clearly intended
an "inquiry broader than mere chronological age." 52 The court identified spe-
cific references to age in the capital sentencing provisions and in other sections
of the FSA to support its conclusion that age was not synonymous with "imma-
40. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). The statutory purposes of sentencing are set out in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (1983).
41. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a), (b) (1983).
42. See, e.g., State v. Lattimore, 310 N.C. 295, 311 S.E.2d 876 (1984) (defendant induced others
or was a leader; armed robbery and second degree murder); State v. Edwards, 310 N.C. 142, 310
S.E.2d 610 (1984) (pecuniary gain may not be considered in theft cases because pecuniary gain will
always be present; breaking or entering); State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 84, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983) (trial
court's finding in aggravation that the offense of child abuse was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel was prejudicial error); State v. Bethea, 71 N.C. App. 125, 321 S.E.2d 520 (1984) (court may
not aggravate assault on law enforcement officer by use of deadly weapon when such evidence was
necessary to prove element of the offense).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4 (a) (1983).
44. See State v. Spears, 314 N.C. 319, 321, 333 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1985) (evidence must be "un-
contradicted, substantial and manifestly credible") (citing State v. Jones, 309 N.C. 214, 218-19, 306
S.E.2d 451, 454 (1983)); State v. Freeman, 313 N.C. 539, 551, 330 S.E.2d 465, 475 (1985) ("[w]hen a
defendant argues that his evidence is sufficient to compel the finding of a mitigating factor, he bears
the same burden of persuasion of a party seeking a directed verdict") (citing State v. Jones, 309 N.C.
214, 219, 306 S.E.2d 451, 455 (1983)).
45. State v. Spears, 314 N.C. 319, 321, 333 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1985).
46. Moore, 317 N.C. at 280, 345 S.E.2d at 221 ("[c]ase law from this and other jurisdictions
sheds no light on significance of 'immaturity' in regard to adult sentencing").
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(e) (1983).
48. 309 N.C. 570, 308 S.E.2d 302 (1983).
49. Id. at 579, 308 S.E.2d at 308.
50. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 15-17, Moore.
51. Id.
52. Moore, 317 N.C. at 280-81, 345 S.E.2d at 221.
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turity."153 There was no dissent on this issue by either the court of appeals or
the supreme court.
The more significant issue presented by Moore concerns the use of a defend-
ant's admission of prior criminal activity to aggravate a sentence beyond the
presumptive term. The FSA requires the trial judge to consider as an aggravat-
ing factor a "prior conviction or convictions for criminal offenses punishable by
more than 60 days confinement."' 54 The North Carolina Supreme Court has
held that the state has the burden of proving a prior conviction. 55 The FSA
indicates that the conviction "may be proved by a stipulation of the parties or by
the original or certified copy of the court record of the prior conviction."'5 6 The
supreme court has interpreted this language to be permissive rather than exclu-
sive, and has held that a prior conviction can be proved in a number of ways. 57
In Thompson the court held that a "defendant's [admission of a prior conviction]
under oath constitute[s] an acceptable alternative method of proof."'58 In
Moore, however, defendant admitted only to engaging in criminal activity for
which he had never been convicted.59
The FSA does not preclude the trial judge from finding a nonstatutory ag-
gravating factor so long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing
and proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 6° The North Carolina courts
have approved several nonstatutory factors ranging from a defendant's danger-
ousness61 to a defendant's bad driving record. 62 However, these same courts
have rejected a significant number of nonstatutory factors. In State v.
Blackwelder63 the trial judge found as an aggravating factor that the "presump-
tive sentence of 15 years [did] not do justification to the seriousness of the [the]
crime." 64 The supreme court held that "factors such as deterrence or serious-
ness of a crime were presumably considered [by the general assembly] in deter-
mining the presumptive sentence for the offense."'65 Therefore, those factors
53. Id.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1340.4(a)(1)(o) (1983).
55. See, eg., State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983) (state has burden of
proving prior conviction but does not have burden of proving that defendant was not indigent and
uncounselled).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(e) (1983).
57. See State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983) (defendant's admission of
prior conviction acceptable proof).
58. Id. at 424, 307 S.E.2d at 159.
59. Moore, 317 N.C. at 276-79, 345 S.E.2d at 219-21.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). See State v. Spears, 314 N.C. 319, 321-22, 333
S.E.2d 242, 244 (1985) (discussing which factors must be considered under the FSA).
61. State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 272, 307 S.E.2d 339, 357 (1983) (bizarre manner of murder
and kidnapping reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing); State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169,
180, 301 S.E.2d 71, 78 (1983) (finding that defendant is dangerous sex offender reasonably related to
purposes of sentencing); State v. Aheam, 307 N.C. 584, 603-04, 300 S.E.2d 689, 702 (1983) (finding
that defendant's dangerous propensity caused by social and emotional problems reasonably related
to purposes of sentencing).
62. See, eg., State v. Mitchell, 62 N.C. App. 21, 28-30, 302 S.E.2d 265, 270-71 (1983) (bad
driving record proper to consider for aggravating DUI, manslaughter sentence).
63. 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983).
64. Id. at 418, 306 S.E.2d at 788.
65. Id. at 418, 306 S.E.2d at 789.
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could not be used to aggravate the sentence.
The broad discretion accorded trial courts6 6 has usually included the power
to consider evidence of character and past criminal behavior for purposes of
sentencing.67 In United States v. Cusenza68 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit permitted a trial judge to consider evidence of prior
criminal activity even though the defendant had pleaded not guilty to related
charges. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in commenting on a proper judicial role during sentencing has emphasized its
approval when trial judges administer individualized sentences.69 Because
sentences that are within the statutory limits generally are not subject to review,
judges are encouraged under such a policy to use broad discretion in sentencing.
However, this broad discretionary power vested in the district judge reflects an
attitude toward the sentencing process that the FSA does not embrace.
Although one of the stated purposes of the FSA is to impose a punishment com-
mensurate with the injury the offense has caused, 70 the FSA intentionally disfa-
vors broad judicial discretion to accomplish that goal.71
Prior to enactment of the FSA trial judges in North Carolina were en-
couraged to inquire into a number of factors, including character, in determin-
ing a proper sentence. In State v. Smith72 the trial court, despite defendant's
objection, admitted into evidence a fingerprint study that indicated defendant
had a prior conviction in South Carolina. 73 Defendant denied the conviction,
but the trial court found it reliable hearsay and considered the alleged conviction
as a factor during sentencing.74 The supreme court concluded that the finger-
print study was hearsay, and had it been introduced at trial rather than at sen-
tencing it may not have been admissible. 75 However, the supreme court affirmed
66. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
67. See United States v. Fulbright, 804 F.2d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 1986) ("sentencing judge has
wide discretion to consider all relevant matters of a defendant's past conduct and character in arriv-
ing at and imposing appropriate punishment"); United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d
Cir. 1984) (sentencing judge may rely on assessment of defendant's truthfulness) (citing United
States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1978)); U.S. v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1315 (7th Cir. 1982)
(trial court has discretion to rely upon presentence reports containing references to prior criminal
records establishing propensity towards crime), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983); People v. Brew-
ster, 184 Cal. App. 3d 921, 229 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1986) (evidence connecting defendant with prior
murder which was suppressed in earlier prosecutions was properly considered in aggravating sen-
tencing); People v. Robinson, 147 Mich. App. 509, 510, 382 N.W.2d 809, 810 (1985) (per curium)
("sentencing court may consider other criminal activities in which defendant was involved even
though they did not result in ... convictions"); State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 350 N.W.2d 633
(1984) (primary factors trial court could consider in sentencing are seriousness of offense, character,
and protection of public).
68. 749 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1984).
69. United States v. Ingram, 530 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1976).
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (1983).
71. The North Carolina General Assembly incorporated many of the factors used in sentencing
into the FSA. See Blackwelder, 309 N.C. at 418, 306 S.E.2d at 789 ("factors such as deterrence or
the seriousness of a crime were presumably considered [by the General Assembly] in determining the
presumptive sentence for the offense"). See infra text accompanying notes 78-83, 104-105.
72. 300 N.C. 71, 265 S.E.2d 164 (1980).





the trial court's actions and reiterated what had been the traditional rule of per-
mitting wide latitude to the trial court during a sentencing hearing.76 The court
emphasized that in "determining [a] proper sentence.., it is appropriate for the
trial judge to inquire into such matters as the age, character, education, environ-
ment, habits, mentality, propensities, and record of the defendant." 77
Many of the factors outlined in Smith were incorporated into the FSA's list
of statutory mitigating and aggravating factors. A defendant's "good character"
and "reputation" are mitigating factors under the statute;78 the fact that a de-
fendant took advantage of a position of trust and confidence to commit the of-
fense is considered to be an aggravating factor.7 9 Arguably, some of the broad
judicial discretion outlined in Smith was taken from the courts and limited by
the FSA. This would be consistent with the thrust behind determinate sentenc-
ing schemes.8 0 However, the general assembly clearly reserved some discretion
for the trial court because the FSA expressly permits the judge to find any factor
"reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing."8 1 In Moore the court rea-
soned that defendant's admission of prior criminal activity was evidence of char-
acter, a factor related to the purposes of sentencing.8 2 Therefore, the court
concluded the acts "were appropriately considered an aggravating factor in the
determination of [Moore's] sentence."8 3
The final issue facing the court in Moore concerned the proper weight that
should be accorded to a particular mitigating or aggravating factor.8 4 The FSA
is silent as to how particular factors are to be weighed against one another.
There is no suggestion that statutory factors should be given more weight than
nonstatutory factors. The judge is required to show only that a factor is "proved
by the preponderance of the evidence." 85
Following enactment of the FSA, it was clear that trial courts were wary of
using one factor in aggravation to outweigh several mitigating factors.86 Conse-
quently, trial courts began to search for nonstatutory factors that would support
an aggravation of the sentence.87 A typical case is State v. Massey."8 In Massey
the trial court found as an aggravating factor defendant's association with mem-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 81-82, 265 S.E.2d at 171.
78. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(m) (1983).
79. See id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(n).
80. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). Arguably, an overly broad reading of this power
will make other components of the FSA meaningless.
82. Moore, 317 N.C. at 278, 345 S.E.2d at 220.
83. Id. at 279-80, 345 S.E.2d at 220-21.
84. Id. at 276-77, 345 S.E.2d at 219. The trial court in Moore found that the admissions of
criminal activity, a nonstatutory aggravating factor, outweighed the two statutory mitigating factors
of defendant's good character and no prior criminal convictions. Id.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.1
87. See State v. Baucom, 66 N.C. App. 298, 301-02, 311 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1984) (dicta expressing
concern over the number of cases being remanded for nonstatutory aggravating factors).
88. 62 N.C. App. 66, 302 S.E.2d 262 (1983).
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bers of a motorcycle gang that dealt in drugs.89 The court of appeals remanded
for resentencing, reasoning that "this finding of 'culpability by association' bears
no relation to the stated purposes of the [FSA]." 90
The court of appeals was quick to recognize what the trial courts were at-
tempting to do. In State v. Baucom 91 the court of appeals reminded judges that
"only one factor in aggravation is necessary to support a sentence greater than
the presumptive term."'92 The court suggested that once a statutory aggravating
factor is found it would be prudent for courts to "exercise restraint" when con-
sidering nonstatutory factors, because they were not necessary ingredients to an
aggravated sentence. 93
In State v. Parker94 the supreme court commented on the dicta in Baucom
by noting that the weighing process lies within the sole discretion of the trial
court and should not be overturned "unless it is 'manifestly unsupported by
reason.' -95 However, the court in Parker emphasized that "[iln some cases a
single, relatively minor aggravating circumstance simply will not reasonably
outweigh a number of highly significant mitigating factors."96 Relying on this
precedent, Justice Martin in Moore concluded that the trial court properly exer-
cised its discretion in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors.97
Although the issue of how various factors are to be weighed under the FSA
is critical during the sentencing process,98 the issue of admissions of criminal
activity in Moore is more noteworthy. The rule allowing admissions of prior
criminal activity to bear on character garnished support from all seven jus-
tices.99 Despite the apparent unanimity on that point this Note argues that such
a result is not a foregone conclusion under the FSA.
The formulation of the rule hinges on defining admissions of criminal activ-
ity as a character trait. The court in Moore suggests it has consistently approved
the use of character for purposes of sentencing both before and after the FSA
was enacted.l10 However, the authority cited by the court to support its propo-
89. Id. at 69, 302 S.E.2d at 264.
90. Id.
91. 66 N.C. App. 298, 311 S.E.2d 73 (1984).
92. Id. at 301-02, 311 S.E.2d at 75.
93. Id.
94. 315 N.C. 249, 337 SE.2d 497 (1985).
95. Id. at 258, 337 S.E.2d at 503 (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829,
833 (1985)).
96. Id. at 260, 337 S.E.2d at 503-04.
97. Moore, 317 N.C. at 279-80, 345 S.E.2d at 221.
98. Weighing becomes even more critical once the trial judge is permitted to consider admis-
sions of criminal activity as bearing on character. Although the supreme court has said that the
length of a sentence and its relation to the seriousness of the crime were factors that were presuma-
bly considered by the general assembly when setting the presumptive term, Blackwelder, 309 N.C. at
418, 306 S.E.2d at 789, allowing the trial judge wide discretion to weigh an admission of prior
criminal activity will result in trial judges preempting the mandate of the FSA.
99. Moore, 317 N.C. at 275-76, 345 S.E.2d at 217-18. The three dissenters in Moore agreed that
character could be influenced by past criminal activity and therefore could be considered during the
sentencing process. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
100. Moore, 317 N.C. at 278-79, 345 S.E.2d at 220 ("this Court has consistently approved...
assessment of character evidence for purposes of sentencing").
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sition predates enactment of the FSA. 10 1 There is no doubt that the FSA re-
served to trial judges some discretion to consider character during sentencing.10 2
However, the majority opinion in Moore suggests that the broad discretion out-
lined by the dicta in Smith 1 0 3 continues to govern under the FSA. This sugges-
tion ignores the fact that the FSA incorporated many of the factors that Smith
deemed appropriate for sentencing. 1° 4 The court in Moore failed to recognize
that the expansive definition of "character" might need to be pruned in light of
the FSA. If the thrust of the FSA is to reduce judicial discretion, allowing
judges the wide latitude to assess character as permitted in Smith is inconsistent
with one of the purposes behind the Act.105
The court's inattention to these competing interests is illustrated by its si-
lence as to why the FSA puts such a heavy emphasis on prior convictions. The
reasoning employed by the majority suggests that any criminal activity proved
by a preponderance of the evidence can be used to aggravate the sentence re-
gardless of whether the defendant was convicted of the crime. Although this is
the practice in most jurisdictions,10 6 such a rule in North Carolina would con-
siderably moot the "prior convictions" component of the FSA. If Moore accu-
rately gauges the intention of the general assembly, then the inclusion of the
prior convictions component in the FSA was unnecessary.10 7
Finally, even if the rule in Moore is accepted as proper analysis, the major-
ity misapplied the rule to the facts. The trial judge equated the criminal activity
101. The FSA was enacted in final form in 1981. See supra note 2. The majority cited Smith,
which was decided in 1980. For a discussion of Smith, see supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983), allows trial judges to consider nonstatutory
factors reasonably related to purposes of sentencing. See State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 597, 300
S.E.2d 689, 697 (1983) (" 'The fair sentencing act did not remove, nor did it intend to remove, all
discretion from the sentencing judge.' ") (quoting State v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 330, 333-34, 293
S.E.2d 658, 661 (1982)).
103. Smith, 300 N.C. at 81-82, 265 S.E.2d at 171. See supra text accompanying note 77 (noting
it is proper for trial court to inquire into age, character, education, habits, mentality and
propensities).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
105. The problem is defining what the trial court should be able to consider under the heading of
character. The court in Moore held that because defendant put his character in issue "specific
wrongful acts... may be brought out to show his character." Moore, 317 N.C. at 278, 345 S.E.2d at
220 (citing 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 108 (1982)). If defendant
admitted on the stand that he had a history of violent activity, then the trial court should find this
dangerous propensity as bearing on character. See State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 603-04, 300
S.E.2d 689, 701-02 (1983) (finding that defendant is dangerous is reasonably related to purposes of
sentencing), However, how do we reconcile evidence of prior criminal activity in which there has
not been a conviction with a statute that puts a heavy emphasis on prior convictions?
106. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
107. If all evidence of prior criminal activity bears on character, will the court permit evidence of
crime for which the defendant has been acquitted to aggravate a sentence? See, eg., United States v.
Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972) (sentencing judge may properly refer to evidence of crimes
for which defendant has been acquitted); People v. Robinson, 147 Mich. App. 509, 382 N.W.2d 809
(1985) (per curiam) (trial court may consider other criminal activity even though there was no
charge or conviction). Prior convictions do "bear on an offender's deserts." von Hirsch, Desert and
Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591, 592 (1981). The general assembly pre-
sumably considered this when they enacted the FSA. Should prior criminal activity be accorded the
same status as a prior conviction? If the weighing of aggravating factors and mitigating factors lies
within the sole discretion of the trial judge, then treating the admissions as an aggravating factor is
the de facto equivalent of treating the admissions as a prior conviction.
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with the standard for prior convictions by setting out each offense and its proper
classification.10 8 The dissent argued that the trial court did not consider the
admissions as bearing on character as required by the rule set out by the major-
ity.10 9 Moreover, the dissent suggested that even if the admissions had been
considered as to character they would have been mitigating in part rather than
completely aggravating.110 Regardless of how the factors should have been
weighed the dissent was justified in concluding that the sentencing judge "deter-
mined to aggravate the sentence as if defendant had been criminally convicted in
the past." '11 1 That is not the rule set out by the court in Moore.112
The decision in Moore is a significant development in the law of sentencing
because of its potential impact on the FSA. Recent statistical analysis has
shown that contrary to many of the dire forecasts that accompanied adoption of
the FSA, 113 active sentences varied considerably less and became more accu-
rately predictable as a result of the FSA presumptive-term provisions. This
analysis suggests that the goal of reducing sentencing disparity is being achieved.
As the variations have declined, however, judicial dissatisfaction with the
FSA has increased. Although the FSA has removed a considerable amount of
judicial discretion, frustration among judges has set in as they have learned that
a felon's behavior in prison routinely shortens the sentences they impose by
about sixty percent. 1 14
Judicial reaction, however, should not be attributed solely to restrictions on
judicial discretion in the Act. Ambiguities and loopholes created by an atmos-
phere of political compromise also contribute to the misapplication of various
components of the Act. The "prior convictions" provision and the power to
consider any factors reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing illustrate
inconsistency in the statute. One commentator has suggested that judicial dis-
content is partly a by-product of an unsupervised system in which appellate re-
view only corrects egregious errors.11 5
Moore illustrates the inherent conflict in any approach that attempts to re-
duce sentencing disparity. Judges charged with enforcing the provisions of the
legislation are grappling with a reduction in their discretionary powers. It is
inevitable that, if unchecked, erosions of the restraints on discretion will occur
and will pare back any successes in reducing disparity in criminal sentencing.
More than a decade has passed since the Twentieth Century Task Force on
Criminal Sentencing recognized that "we [had] become a nation of extremes
108. Moore, 317 N.C. at 277, 345 S.E.2d. at 219.
109. Id. at 281-83, 345 S.E.2d at 222 (Exum, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 282, 345 S.E.2d at 222 (Exum, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 283, 345 S.E.2d at 222 (Exum, J., dissenting).
112. The majority's application of the rule illustrates that despite the court's acknowledgement
of Judge Becton's concerns, in effect the admission of criminal activity is now synonymous with a
prior conviction. See supra text accompanying note 25.
113. S. CLARKE, supra note 38, at 9-22.
114. S. CLARKE, supra note 38, at 14-15, 24-25. The shortening occurs as a result of the good
time/gain time provisions of the FSA. Id.
115. S. CLARKE, supra note 38, at 5-6, 23-24.
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when it comes to sentences." 116 Sentencing disparities were charged with un-
dermining the entire criminal justice structure. North Carolina's adoption of a
determinate sentencing model has gone a long way towards correcting some of
the imbalances. Judicial authorities would do well to take notice of this short-
lived success. Rethinking the underpinnings of the decision in Moore would be a
step in the right direction.
TERRENCE J. TRUAX
116. See TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 6.
13071987]
